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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to §78-2-2(4) Utah Code Annotated (as 
amended, 2001), and §78-2a-3(2)(h) as an Appeal from final Orders granting a Petition 
for Modification of a Divorce Decree in the First Judicial District Court.. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Do the facts support a finding that Appellant cohabitated within the 
meaning of section 30-3-5(9) UCA and paragraph 18 of the Decree of Divorce? 
2. Standard of Review: The issue in this case is a mixed question of fact and 
law. Consequently, the appeals court is not bound by the conclusion of the trial court. 
Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985). Furthermore, the appeals courts in 
Utah are vested with broad equitable powers in divorce actions when reviewing a trial 
courts decision. Haddow, supra see also Read v. Read. 594 P.2d 871, 872-73 (Utah 
1979). 
3. The issues raised in this appeal were raised in the trial court, being 
substantive rather that technical and are thus preserved for appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. 
RULES. AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5(9) (2000) states: 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former 
spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying 
alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another 
person. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case 
This is a domestic action wherein Respondent (Carlos M. Dibble) seeks to be 
relieved from the obligation to pay alimony to Petitioner (Janae S. Dibble)1 arising from a 
Decree of Divorce entered October 13, 1998, in the First Judicial District Court for Box 
Elder County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding. (R. 193)2. 
Respondent alleges that alimony should terminate by reason of Petitioner's cohabitation, 
as set forth in said Decree at paragraph 18: 
Respondent shall pay Petitioner alimony in the amount of 
$3,500.00 per month for a period of 11 years commencing 
September 1, 1998. Alimony shall terminate upon 
Petitioner's remarriage or cohabitation with a member of the 
opposite sex as provided by Section 30-3-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, or the death of either party. (R. 202) 
Course of Proceedings 
Respondent filed a Petition for Modification on May 26, 2000, with the First 
Judicial District Court for Box Elder County, State of Utah. (R. 225). Petitioner was 
served with a Summons and the Petition for Modification on May 30, 2000. (R. 288-
1
 Janae S. Dibble has married Mr. Terry, on or about October 6, 2000, and is now 
know as Janae S. Terry. Her remarriage was not at issue in the trial court proceeding. ® 
496, paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact). 
2
 For purposes of this Brief, reference to the abbreviation "Tr." shall mean the page 
number of the transcript of Trial, March 21-22,2001, and reference to the abbreviation 
"R." shall mean the page number of the general record from the First District Court. 
2 
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289). Petitioner, by counsel, filed an Answer to Petition for Modification3 on or about 
June 26, 2000. (R. 230). Petitioner filed an Order to Show Cause In Re: Contempt on 
or about June 28, 2000, requesting the Respondent to show cause, if any, why the 
Respondent should not be held in contempt of court for failing to pay alimony. (R. 236). 
On October 11, 2000, the court issued an Order following a hearing on Petitioner's Order 
to Show Cause. (R. 380). In the order, the court award a judgment of delinquent alimony 
through the month of August 2000 in the sum of $14,750, but stayed the enforcement of 
$9,500 of the judgment until such time as the court hears the Respondent's Petition for 
Modification. (R. 380-381). Respondent paid $5,250 as satisfaction of the portion of the 
judgment not stayed by the court. (R. 378). 
Respondent's Petition for Modification was tried to the Honorable Judge Ben H. 
Hadfield on March 21 and 22, 2001, without a jury. The entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were entered by the court on or about August 6,2001. (R: 489). The 
court also entered an Order Modifying Decree of Divorce on or about August 6, 2001, in 
which Respondent's obligation to pay alimony was terminated as of October 1, 1998, and 
Respondent was award a judgment in the amount of $67,854 against Petitioner.4 
3
 Respondent raised several issues in his Petition for Modification and the court's 
resulting Order from the trial on the Petition for Modification. The issue raised on appeal 
only concerns the court's decision with regards to Respondent's request that alimony be 
terminated as a result of Petitioner's alleged cohabitation which the court ordered. 
4
 Paragraph 3 of the Order Modifying Decree of Divorce states the following: 
. . . the Respondent be and he is hereby awarded a judgment 
3 
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Statement of Facts 
Petitioner and Respondent were divorce October 13,1998. Petitioner was awarded 
custody of the parties children, child support, various marital property, and monthly 
alimony. (R. 193-208). Respondent was order to pay Petitioner as alimony $3,500 per 
month for a period of 11 years from September 1, 1998. (Paragraph 18 of the Decree of 
Divorce, R 202). The decree provides that alimony shall terminate upon Petitioner's 
remarriage or cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex as provided by Section 30-
3-5, Utah Code Annotated, or the death of either party. (Paragraph 18 of the Decree of 
Divorce, R 202). 
At trial, the court found that during sometime in March 1997 met a Mr. Mitchell 
Adams ("Mr. Adams") at a seminar in Colorado. (R. 490, Findings of Fact paragraph 2; 
Trans, p. 3, In. 18-24). Mr. Adams and Petitioner did not know each other before that 
time. (Trans, p. 3, In. 25, p. 4, In. 1-2). While in Colorado attending that seminar, Mr. 
Adams and Petitioner had sexual contact. (R. 490, Findings of Fact paragraph 2). After 
against the Petitioner for the sum of $67,854 provided 
however, that execution on said judgment shall be stayed and 
the Respondent shall be permitted to deduct the sum of 
$1,192.00, per month from his child support obligation of 
$3,000.00 per month and to credit the amount of $ 1,192.00 
monthly until the judgment is fully paid and satisfied. The 
Judgment shall not bear interest. ® 486). 
It is understood from the court's memorandum decision ® 482) the $67,854 is for 
repayment of an overpayment of alimony by Respondent paid Petitioner from October 1, 
1998, the date the court terminated Respondent's alimony obligation in the Order. 
4 
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March of 1997, Petitioner and Mr. Adams communicated by telephone and e-mail. (R. 
490, Findings of Fact, paragraph 3). The court further found that Petitioner and Mr. 
Adams met each other face-to-face over the next several months in Colorado, California, 
Florida and Utah, with sexual contact at each meeting. (R. 490, Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 3). 
The court found that during the late summer of 1998, Petitioner and Mr. Adams 
became engaged and that in the early fall of 1998 Petitioner decided to move with her 
children to the State of Florida. (R. 491, Findings of Fact, paragraph 2 and 3). Mr. 
Adams agreed to arrange for a separate home for Petitioner and her children to use in 
Florida until their marriage. Mr. Adams decided to acquire a larger home that Petitioner 
and her children could use. (R. 491-492, Findings of Fact, paragraph 3). Mr. Adams 
testified at trial he intended Petitioner and her children to stay at the larger home until Mr. 
Adams and Petitioner married. (Trans, p. 29, In. 2-5, p. 52, In. 7-19). Mr. Adams failed 
to purchase the larger home because he was not able to obtain financing. (Trans, p. 52, 
In. 17-20). As a result, Petitioner had no choice but to temporarily stay with Mr. Adams 
until the other arrangements could be found. Mr. Adams further testified that while 
Petitioner and her children stayed at his home Mr. thought their stay would be temporary. 
(Trans, p. 52, In. 21-25, p. 53, In. 1-3). 
Respondent's twenty year son (Derrick Dibble) testified at trial that it was his 
when Petitioner and her children would arrive in Florida that it was his understanding and 
5 
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expectation that Petitioner and his siblings would be staying at another home until 
Petitioner's and Mr. Adams' marriage. (Trans, p.126, In. 8-25, p. 127, In. 1). Derrick 
Dibble also testified that while they stayed at Mr. Adams' home he understood and 
expected that another home would become available (Trans, p. 127, In. 20-25, p. 128, In. 
1-20, p. 150, In. 10-11). 
Petitioner's and Respondent's daughter (Erica Storey) testified at trial that it was 
her understanding and expectation that when she and her mother would arrive in Florida 
they would reside in a different home than Mr. Adams. (Trans, p. 152, In 4-25, p. 153, In. 
1-10). Erica Storey testified that while they stayed with Mr. Adams, they would move to 
other home without Mr. Adams until the marriage. (Trans, p. 153, In. 11-19). In addition 
to Derrick Dibble's and Erica Storey's testimony, Matthew Zerkle, a friend of the family 
who stayed approximately the entire time with Petitioner and her children at Mr. Adams 
home in Florida, testified that it was his understanding and expectation that they would 
not be in the same home as Mr. Adams. (Trans, p. 159, In. 13-19). be in a separate home 
in 
Petitioner testified that it was her understanding and expectation that she and her 
children would not reside in the same home as Mr. Adams until they married. (Trans, p. 
174, In. 23-25, p. 175, In. 1-13). Petitioner understood and expected a different home 
would be ready for her and her children when she arrived in Florida. Id. Petitioner 
6 
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further testified that no date of marriage had been established and that she considered Mr. 
Adams' relationship as a friendship. Id. 
Upon Petitioner's arrival in Florida, she began looking for alternative place to stay 
so she and her children could move out of Mr. Adams' home. Mr. Adams testifies of this 
fact (Trans, pg 53, In. 4-22), Erica Storey testifies of this fact (Trans, pg. 153, In. 11-25, 
pg. 154, In. 1-17), and Matthew Zerkle testifies of this fact (Trans, pg. 159, In. 20-25, pg. 
160, In. 1-7). Petitioner returned to Utah October 13, 1998, to rent a place in Davis 
County. (Trans, pg. 169, In. 13-25, pg. 170, In. 1-25, pg. 171, In. 1-4). 
Petitioner and her children only move a few of their personal belongings into Mr. 
Adams' home. Only certain furniture, a mattress, and minimal personal items were 
brought in from the moving trucks. (R. 493-494, Findings of Fact paragraph 8.d.). In 
fact, most of Petitioner's and her children's personal belongings stayed in the moving 
trucks. Id. The moving trucks were eventually repossessed by the moving truck company 
with Petitioner's and the children's belongings. Id. 
Mr. Adams and Petitioner did not share in the expenses of Mr. Adams' home. (R. 
493, Findings of Fact paragraph 8.c). The court found that Petitioner did not contribute 
to the payment of any indebtedness against the Adams residence, utilities at the Adams 
residence. Id. Mr. Adams testified that his finances were not shared with the Petitioner 
and that Petitioner purchased food for herself and her children. (Trans, pg. 55, In. 21-25, 
pg. 56, In. 1-3). 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The found that the Petitioner and her children had sleeping arrangements whereby 
one male child and a male friend slept in one bedroom at the Adams residence, that the 
children and Petitioner slept on mattresses and/or a couch in the living and/or dining 
room, and that one female child slept on a couch. (R. 494, Findings of Fact paragraph 
8.g.). 
The court found that the Petitioner and her children moved to Florida between the 
mid-September 1998 and returned to Utah on or about the Thanksgiving holiday in 1998. 
(R. 492-494, Findings of Fact paragraph 6. And 8.1.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah case law has clearly defined cohabitation under section 30-3-5(9) of the Utah 
Code Annotated. The weight of the facts of this case indicate that Mrs. Dibble's stay with 
Mr. Adams was temporary, and did not constitute cohabitation under Utah law. The trial 
court abused its discretion by misapplying the facts of this case to the case law concerning 
cohabitation. The proper conclusion when applying Utah law to the facts of this case is 
that Mrs. Dibble did not cohabitation with Mr. Adams and alleged. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT FAIL TO SATISFY THE 
DEFINITION OF COMMON RESIDENCY AS DEFINED BY UTAH 
LAW. 
The law involving cohabitation is well settled in Utah. In the case of Haddow v. 
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme court established a two prong test 
8 
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for cohabitation. The first prong of the test is common residency. The second prong of 
the test is sexual contact evidencing conjugal association. Several Utah cases since 
Haddow have following and applied Haddow's two prong test. See, Pendleton v. 
Pendleton. 918 P.2d 159 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Hill v. Hill 968 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 
1998). In Haddow. the court went on to state that "common residency means the sharing 
of a common abode that both parties consider their principal domicile for more than a 
temporary or brief period of time." Id. at 672. "Cohabitation is not a sojourn, nor a habit 
of visiting, nor even remaining with for a time; the term implies continuity." Id. at 673 
(quoting Burke v. Burke. 340 P.2d 948, 950 (Or. 1959)). The court in Haddow also stated 
that the residency clause of the termination of alimony statue was drafted for the same 
purpose as the cohabitation clause in the decree of divorce. Id. 
"Residency" is not a defined term in the termination of alimony statute, however, 
the Utah Supreme Court has defined the word "residing" as used in the statue as: "To 
dwell permanently or for a length of time; to have a settled abode for a time." Knuteson 
v. Knuteson. 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1980) (quoting Webster's New Twentieth 
Century Dictionary, 2nd. Edition). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Knuteson, affirmed Third District Judge Christine M. 
Durham's decision not to terminate the recipient spouse's alimony based on the 
termination of alimony statute. In Knuteson. the recipient spouse moved in with a 
neighbor for roughly two months and ten days, at least in part because of the grim 
9 
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financial situation brought about by her exhusband's non-payment of alimony. Id. at 
1388. Although she candidly confessed to having sexual relations with the neighbor, Mr. 
Conder, the reviewing court refused to terminate her right to receive alimony because 
"the wording of the statute does not appear to cover a temporary stay at another's home." 
Id. at 1389. 
The Knuteson decision supports Petitioner's arguments in this case. In Knuteson. 
Mrs. Knuteson stayed with Mr. Conder for a period of two months and ten days. In the 
present case, the court found that the Petitioner stayed with Mr. Adams from mid-
September 1998 to about the Thanksgiving holiday of 1998. This is the same amount of 
time that Mrs. Knuteson stayed with Mr. Conder, plus or minus a day or so. The exact 
date of the Petitioner's arrival was not exactly established. The court in Knuteson 
determined that 2 months and 10 tens did not establish permanent residence. 
Knuteson also based its decision on the fact that a financial emergency occurred 
before Mrs. Knuteson's move to Mr. Condor's home. Similarly, an emergency caused 
Petitioner in this case to temporarily stay with Mr. Adams. Petitioner drove across the 
United States with the expectation of staying in separate homes. When she arrived, Mr. 
Adams had not been able to secure the other home for Petitioner. Petitioner was forced to 
temporary stay with Mr. Adams. Petitioner made attempts of securing separate living 
arrangements in Florida. She even returned to Utah on October 13,1998, and arranged 
for an apartment in Davis County. 
10 
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The Haddow decision is a powerful precedent for this case. In Haddow, the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order that the ex-wife pay her former husband 
one-half of the equity in the home in which she was living pursuant to an equitable lien 
established in the divorce decree. The reviewing court held that the trial court had 
improperly construed the "cohabitation" language in the decree. Haddow. 707 P.2d at 
670. The trial court found that the spouse spent most of her free time with her boyfriend, 
Mr. Hudson. Mr. Hudson had dinner at the spouse's house five or six times a week, and 
spent the night with her approximately once a week. Mr. Hudson would leave clothes at 
her home, which she would launder, and sometimes take to the dry cleaner. He would 
sometimes shower and change at her home. Mr. Hudson maintained a separate residence 
at his parent's home. He did use her home as a mailing address for a couple of bank 
accounts. There was no evidence that they shared any assets or had any joint financial 
accounts, projects, or liabilities. Mr. Hudson gave the spouse money to reimburse her for 
the food he ate, and took her car to be serviced at a car dealership where he worked. 
"Beyond that, Mr. Hudson made no financial or tangible contributions to appellant or to 
her household, nor did he share living expenses with her in any sense." Id. at 670-71. 
The court found it significant that Mr. Hudson did not pay any of the receiving spouse' 
living expenses, or consistently share her assets. He did not contribute to the mortgage 
payment, the insurance on the house, or the utility bills. They rarely shared automobiles. 
Id. at 673-74. The court recognized Mr. Hudson's reimbursements for food and dry 
11 
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cleaning as evidence of their intent that each bear their own expenses. Id. at 674. In 
addition, the court was not critical of the fact that Mr. Hudson left a van parked at the 
receiving spouse's home fore several months for storage purposes, rather than for the 
convenience of daily use. Mr. Hudson and the spouse had been dating each other 
exclusively for about fourteen months. They also took trips together to Hawaii and Elko, 
Nevada. Id. at 672. 
In the present case, Petitioner and Mr. Adams did not share expenses. Mr. Adams 
did not require Petitioner to share in any of his expenses. The share a few meals. 
Petitioner paid for her and her children's food. These facts are consist with the facts in 
Haddow. The facts found by the trial court do not establish a permanent residence. 
Petitioner and Mr. Adams did not have a permanent residence. 
It is important to break apart each part of the Haddow definition. First, the parties 
must share a common abode. Second, both parties consider the adobe their principal 
domicile. Third, the parties must consider that the domicile is for more than a temporary 
or brief period of time. In this case, the findings of fact do not establish this prong of the 
cohabitation test. 
In the present case, Ms. Dibble moved to Florida and for a short period stayed with 
Mr. Adams with her children. Therefore, the parties shared a common abode for a short 
time. However, both parties did not consider the abode their principal domicile. This is 
clear form the testimony at trial from all parties who live in the home. Mr. Adams 
12 
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testified that Ms. Dibble's intentions were to more to Florida and move into a separate 
house that Mr. Adams was arranging. Mr. Adams further testified that this was what he 
intended and understand would happen. But, financing for the second home became a 
problem. While in Florida, Ms. Dibble continued to pursue finding alternative residence, 
a residence were she and her children could stay while Mr. Adams stayed in the home he 
already had. This clearly shows that the parties did not consider the abode their principal 
domicile. Mr. Adams may have considered it his principal domicile. But, Ms. Dibble did 
not consider it her principal domicile. Mr. Adams did not consider it her principal 
domicile as well. Ms. Dibble's children did not consider it their principle domicile as 
well. Petitioner's children testified they understood that when they were going to Florida 
that they would reside in a different home than Mr. Adams. Therefore, the trial court's 
findings clearly show Petitioner did not consider the home her principal domicile before 
leaving for Florida, when arriving at Florida, while staying in Florida, and when leaving 
Florida. 
Finally, the parties must consider that the domicile is for more than a temporary or 
brief period of time. In this case, Ms. Dibble moved to Florida sometime after mid-
September 1998. She left on Thanksgiving day 1998. At best, two months and twelve 
days. This is a temporary or brief period of time. In Knuteson v. Knutesom 619 P.2d 
1387,1389 (Utah 1980), the Court held that a stay of two months and ten days did not 
establish a settled abode. In this case, the time is similar or less. In addition, Petitioner 
13 
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from the day she arrived and until she left in November was pursuing alternative 
residence. 
Moreover, Petitioner had in fact left Florida in October and rented an apartment in 
Farmington, Utah. Clearly at time period less than the time in Knuteson. After spending 
about a week in Utah in October, she returned to Florida to obtain her belongings and 
move back to Utah. Petitioner's intentions and understanding are supported by Mr. 
Adams' testimony and Ms. Cobbley's testimony, both who were the appellee's witnesses. 
At no time did Ms. Dibble considered Mr. Adams' home her principle domicile. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah case law has clearly defined cohabitation under section 30-3-5(9) of the Utah 
Code Annotated. The weight of the facts of this case indicate that Mrs. Dibble's stay with 
Mr. Adams was temporary, and did not constitute cohabitation under Utah law. The trial 
court abused its discretion by misapplying the facts of this case to the case law concerning 
cohabitation. The proper conclusion when applying Utah law to the facts of this case is 
that Mrs. Dibble did not cohabitation with Mr. Adams and alleged. 
DATED this 2 ^ day of AjVrt I , 2002. 
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